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IN ,.fHE SUPREME COlJRT
OF THE STATE OF U'JCAH

STATE OF UTAH
In the Interest of

Case
No. 8722

KARL BAILEY
Alleged dependent and
neglected child.

AP·PELLAN'T.'S BRIEF
Submitted by J. GORDON BAILEY, Father of the
Alleged Dependent and Neglected Child.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 30, 1957, Virginia Lee Bennett, Executive
Secretary of the Children's Service Society of Utah, filed
a petition (R. 10) in the Juvenile Court of the Second
Juvenile District in and for Salt Lake County alleging
Karl Bailey, the son of J. Gordon Bailey, Appellant
herein and frequently referred to as Gordon, to be a
neglected and dependent child within the purview of
Utah law. The Children's Service Society of Utah will
be referred to herein as the Society, and since the uncon-

1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tradicted evidence is that the child was named Karl Bernett Bailey, he will be referred to by that name, or simply
as Karl. May 8, 1957, Gordon filed his cross petition
(R. 11), and after a rather lengthy hearing in the matter
the Court made findings of fact and conclusions of la"\v
(R. 22) and entered its Decree and Judgment (R. 25),
adjudging Karl to be a neglected child within the pur~
view of Utah law, depriving Gordon of all rights to the
custody of his son and authorizing the Society to arrange
for his adoption by unidentified foster parents in \vhose
care he had been previously placed by the Society.
Gordon, presently employed as a caretaker at a duck
club and an artist by profession, ''Tas reared and educated
in Utah. After completing high school and prior to his
induction into the United States Army Air Corps in June
of 1943 (R. 214) he was employed in California (R. 212,
213). While serving as a member of the . A.ir Corps he
became Yery interested in the study of art (R-. 214) and
after his return to civilian life, in January, 1946, he
undertook the study of art at various schools, utilizing
his service-earned benefits under the G. I. Bill for this purpose ( R. 215). He has sold paintings and has participated in numerous art exhibits throughout the country
(R. 215, 216, Ex. 14-).
On November 19, 1951, Gordon married one ~Iartha
Bn llder Singer in l\[exico ( R. ~15), \Yhich marriage \Yas
dissolved by a decree of annulment .A. pril 5, 1952 (R. 96),
although the .J UYPnile ('jourt found such annulment to
have bePn 011 ~t"\ptember 24, 1953. This point ''ill be covered in t hP n rgument following.
~)

....
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In the latter part of 1952, or the early part of 1953,
Gordon met Margaret Susan Willis (now Mrs. Jesse
Sharp and called both Margaret and Susan in the record,
and referred to herein as Susan) at an art exhibit banquet (R. 276). Susan had been born in Canada and raised
in England (R. 275). While in England Susan conceived
an illegitmate child (R. 275) which was born after Susan
and her family had migrated to the United States (R.
275), and was placed for adoption out of state (R. 275).
Susan returned to Utah where she resided with her parents in Provo and later in Salt Lake City (R. 275, 276).
Shortly after she met Gordon, Susan asked him if
she could go live with him at Logan, Utah, vvhere he
was attending college (R. 278). There is conflict in the
evidence as to the nature of their relationship prior to
this point. In any event Gordon and Susan lived together
as man and vvife, but without the benefit of a formal marriage, from this time in 1953 until the end of October,
1955 (R. 22, Finding No. 2). There is a substantial conflict in the evidence as to why they were not formally
married, each contending that he desired so to do but
that the other refused, insisting such a formality to be
unnecessary.
During the first part of this time they traveled about
the country, Gordon pursuing his study of art at various
schools (R. 280-284). They held themselves out to others
as being married (R. 89). Susan's family did not lmow
that they were not married until after Susan left Gordon
in October, 1955 (R. 40, 41, 176).
3
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At one time Susan became pregnant, but this pregnancy was terminated by a miscarriage at Santa Rosa,
California (R. 285).
In the spring of 1954 Susan became pregnant again.
In the fall of 1954 Gordon and Susan obtained employment as caretakers at a duck club near Salt Lake City,
Utah (R. 35, 292). On January 7, 1955, their child was
born at the duck club (R. 220, 221, 222, Ex. 7). Gordon
and Susan were alone and the child was deliYered \Yithout the aid of. a doctor and without serious complications
though Susan testified that the child had some trouble,
breathing as though it had a cold (R. 304, 305). Gordon
prepared, signed and filed a birth certificate (Ex. 7)
naming himself as the father and Susan as the mother.
As with many of the occurrences in this case, the reasons for the natural childbirth, \Yho desired it, and similar
rna tters are in conflict.
Gordon notified Susan's mother of the birth of her
grandchild (R. 39). Susan's father named the child Karl
Bernett Bailey ( R. 17 4), Bernett being the middle name
of a deceased brother of Gordon (R. 151).
Gordon, Susan and l{arllived at the club as a family
unit from the birth of the child in January until the end
of October of the same year, during \Yhich time Gordon
held l(arl out ns his son, admitting publicly the paternity of the child - neY(?r denying it - and treating the
ehild in all respt}ets as his son (R. 44, 89, 108, 112, 113,
1:21, 12~, 130, 133, 134, 137, 140, 164, ~~~). Friends, relatiYPS and nt)ighhor~ t('stified at the hearing that the child
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appeared exceptionally healthy and that Gordon .,.was very
fond of it (R. 108, 112, 113, 114, 121, 122, 130, 134, 141,
142), although Susan and members of her family testified
that the child suffered from colds, jaundice and diarrhea
(R. 39, 46, 305).
Near the end of October, 1955, about ten months after
l{arl 's birth, one Jesse Sharp, formerly a close friend of
Gordon, and referred to herein as Sharp, visited for about
three days at the club (R. 309). The day after he left
Susan went into Salt Lake City where she met Sharp
(R. 311). They returned to the club and informed Gordon that they desired to be together (R. 313). They packed
some of Susan's things and, taking Karl with them, left
the club (R. 313). Gordon drove them into Salt Lake
City (R. 314). He testified that he did so, under strain,
rather than risk trouble should their departure be delayed
(R. 224). The following day Susan and Sharp left Utah
for Sacramento, California, and were married in Reno,
Nevada, enroute (R. 314).
Immediately after Susan, Sharp and Karl left the
club, Gordon and Susan's parents attempted to find her,
but their efforts "\Vere futile (R. 40, 145, 163, 174, 175, 181,
226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231). By a letter dated November 10, 1955, and bearing only a general delivery, Sacramento, California, return address, Susan notified Gordon
that she and Sharp were married (Ex. 8).
This marriage was not a happy one and in December of that same year, Susan returned with Karl to her
parents' home in Salt Lake City. She testified that she

5
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thought that if her parents would care for Karl for two
or three weeks so that she and Sharp could spend a little
time together their marriage might improve (R. 315, 318).
Gordon saw Susan at this time, but the unplanned meeting was not a friendly one (R. 236, 316). Gordon's subsequent attempts to communicate with Susan were terminated by a letter from Sharp to Gordon, postmarked February 2, 1956, Salt Lake City, Utah, but without any further return address, addressed to Gordon, who at the time
was working at Moab, Utah, curtly informing him
that any further letters would be returned to him
unopened (Ex. 11).
Unsuccessful in her attempt to get someone to care
for Karl, and without contacting Gordon or any member
of his family, Susan approached the Children's Service
Society of Utah on February 7, 1956, to arrange for temporarily leaving Karl "Tith the Society (R. 317). On behalf of the Society, evidence ''as offered that Susan told
them that the father of the child \Yas Joe Bailey to -whom
she was not married, and that the child \\as born in December, 1954 (R. 56, 70). \\'ithin a da:~ or t\vo l{arl was
left with the Society. Susan did not return for him and
apparently her only contact "Tith the Societ:T between such
time and November 21, 1956, consisted of t"To short phone
calls (R. 58).
In the summer of 1956, Gordon met Lee Deffebach
!{anson (also refPrred to in the record as Helen Hortense
T__Jee Deffehneh Hanson), kno"Tn to her acquaintances as
LeP and so referred to herein (R. 195).

6
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Lee, a graduate from the University of Utah with a
B.A. degree in Art (R. 187) had married one Mr. Hanson
and shortly thereafter the two of them went to Europe.
Lee had been awarded a Fullbright scholarship for the
study of art in Europe. This marriage was not successful,
terminating in Mr. Hanson's suing for divorce in June,
1956. Lee did not contest the action (R. 207). The decree
became final December 12, 1956. Lee went to live with Gordon at the club about the end of August, and upon the expiration of the time for the prior decree to become final they
were married. This was December 14, 1956 (R. 23, 196).
Gordon testified that from the December meeting
with Susan to the commencement of this action he had no
knowledge of the whereabouts of Susan or Karl.
On December 7, 1956, a petition was filed in the Juvenile Court in Salt Lake City alleging Karl to be a dependent and neglected child (R. 4). Gordon received no
notice of this action and was not a party thereto (R. 30).
On December 10, 1956, the petition filed three days earlier
was modified to sho\v the father's name to be J. Gordon
Bailey and the date of birth to be January 7, 1955 (R. 4).
At a hearing on December 12, 1956, Susan and a Mrs.
Alice Olson of the Society were present ( R. 1). Findings
of fact, conclusions of law and an order of continuance
were made (R. 7).
Without breaking the sequence of fact, it should be
here noted that L,ee Deffebach Bailey had been an acquaintance of Virginia Lee Bennett, petitioner in the instant case and Executive Secreary of the Children's Serv7
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ice Society of Utah, since about 1948 (R. 79, 80, 84). Virginia Lee Bennett testified that she had contacted Lee
during the summer of 1956, having been informed by
Lee's parents that she could contact Lee by calling the
phone number of the club, which she did (R. 80). She also
testified that she had received in December, 1956, an
announcement of Gordon's and Lee's marriage. Virginia
I_.jee Bennett testified that it was not until the hearing on
December 10, 1956 (R. 4) that the Society knew that J.
Gordon Bailey was the father of Karl and his consent
necessary for adoption (R. 87, 88, 89).
Virginia Lee Bennett testified that two or three days
after Christmas in that same month she had a conversation with Lee and that Lee told her that she and Gordon
\\'"ere going to take a trip to California (R. 81). At no
time did Virginia Lee Bennett inform Lee that the Society
had custody of Gordon's child (R. 85). During the time
that Gordon and Lee 'Yere out of the state, Susan appeared before the J uYenile Court and relinquished all of
her rights to Karl (R. 8). The Court made its order
placing l(arl 'Yith the Society for placement for adoption ( R. 9, 86). This

"~as

January 16, 1957 (R. 1, 8, 9).

No effort was made by Virginia Lee Bennett, or the Society, to contact Gordon or to inform him in any manner
that the Society had custody of his child until three
months after Susan had relinquished her rights (R. 86}.
On April 19, 1957, Gordon \\'"as contacted by the Society.
On 1\pril ~~'he \Yas askPd to release l(arl so that he could
hP plaePd for adoption (R. 59, 60 .. 86).
8
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At no time since the Society first obtained custody of
Karl has Gordon been allowed or requested to take care
of his son (R. 70, 86).
According to Virginia Lee Bennett and to Mrs. Olson,
Gordon said at the interview of April 22, 1956, that he
would never consent to the adoption of his child, that he
would not fight any proceedings, but that he hoped that
the outcome of the interview would be the return of Karl
to him (R. 62, 71, 81). At about this time Virginia Lee
Bennett informed Gordon in response to his inquiry that
I{arl had not been placed for adoption as of that time
(R. 346).
On April 30, 1957, the case at bar was initiated by a
petition filed by Virginia Lee Bennett alleging Karl to be
a neglected and dependent child on the following grounds:
(1) that Gordon had abandoned the child, ( 2) that the
~hild lacked proper parental care because of the faults
and habits of Gordon, (3) that Gordon has refused and
neglected to provide proper care and necessary subsistence, medical and other care, and ( 4) that the child was
in a situation dangerous to its health and morals by reason of the· foregoing and the irresponsible and immoral
conduct of Gordon. The petition alleged that for the above
reasons, Karl became a neglected and dependent child on
the 30th day of April, 1957 (R. 10). The Society had had
Karl in its custody from about February 9 of the previous
year (R. 4).
By a cross petition filed May 8, 1957, Gordon denied
the allegations of dependency and neglect and alleged,
9
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inter alia, that the child was his legitimate son by virtue
of compliance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
1953, 78-30-12; that because he did not know and had not
been informed of the whereabouts of his son he had not
been able to care for him; that he and his wife desired the
return of the child; that they are competent and capable
persons to have the custody and care of the child; that his
wife desires to adopt the child as her own; and that the
Society refused to return the child to him (R. 11-15).
In the course of the hearing that ensued, the petitioner introduced evidence concerning the events preceding the placing of the child with the Society and subsequent thereto, including testimony concerning medical
treatment, religion, philosophy of life, alleged sexual deviations, unfitness of the home at the club and numerous
diverse matters.
At the end of the petitioner's evidence in chief, a
motion to dismiss the petition was denied (R. 107).
Gordon introduced testimony in his ov.~ behalf rebutting that of the petitioner~ and showing his Yersion of
the matters raised by the petitioner.
The greatest part of the 3:21 pages of testimony are
concerned '''ith events prior to Gordon's marriage to Lee
in Decemh(ll\ 1956, and include the fullest scope of inquiry
imaginable. To recite in detail this testimony would
undul~r h)ng-then this brief.
Aftt)r the close of the evidenre in rhief for Gordon,
the petitionpr offered nnd the Court admitted, oYer ob.ie('t ion, P\·idenr(\ to the effect that unidentified foster par-

10
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POINT II.
KAR.L BERNETT BAILEY IS NOT A NE.GLECTED CHILD WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE
LAW AND THEREFORE THE COURT WAS WITHOUT POWER TO DEPRIVE J. GORDON BAILEY
OF THE. CUSTODY OF HIS SON.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND
IN CONSIDERING IN ITS DECISION EVIDENCE
CONCERNING ALLEGED ADOPTIVE P AR~~~TS.

POINT IV.
THE ORDER PURPORTING TO DEPRIVE J.
GOR.DON BAILEY PERMANENTlY OF ALL
RIGHTS TO THE CUSTODY OF HIS SON AND TO
AUTHORIZE HIS ADOPTION IS VOID BECAUSE
IT IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS AND
IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

POIXT

,T.

EVEN ASSUlVIING THE JUVENILE COURT
TO HAVE HAD THE POWER TO TEMPORARILY
DEPRIVE J. GORDON BAILEY OF THE CUSTODY
OF HIS SON, TO· DO SO WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CONTRARY TO LAW.

POINT \ . 1.
THE· JUDGMENT MUST FAIL BECAUSE
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DO NOT SUPPORT IT.

12
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL c·O·URT ER.RED IN FAIJ-.JING TO
FIND KARL BERNETT BAILEY TO BE ~rHE L·EGITIMATE SON OF J. GORDO·N BAILEY.

Although the court says in its conclusions of law
(R. 24) that "the child may be considered a legitimate
child because of the recognition of said child as his son
by J. Gordon Bailey,'' from the entire treatment of the
case, from the pleadings before Gordon was made a party
to the suit through to the summary order that because of
Gordon's faults and habits and manner of living l{arl was
to be permanently denied the privilege of knowing his
father, it is apparent that the meaning of the clause above
quoted is in effect a denial of a finding of legitimacy.
Susan has voluntarily left the picture. Half of
Karl's natural family has abandoned him. Only his father remains loyal to his child. The treatment accorded
Gordon in this case and the principles applied to its determination are not consistent with the status of parent
and legitimate child, but are consonant with the cruel
legal principles reserved as a social punishment for those
cases wherein a father of an illegitimate child attempts
to obtain its custody from an adverse party having an
equal or superior right.
By a long-standing provision in our law, borrowed
from the California Civil Code, Utah Code Ann. 1953,
78-30-12, provides:
13
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The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as
such with the consent of his wife, if he is married,
into his family, and otherwise treating it as if, it
were a legitimate child, there by adopts it as such,
and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth.
The term ''adoption'' in this statute means and is
used in the sense of ''legitimation.''
Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 32, 31 P. 915; (1892);

Re McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552, 19 L.R.A. 40
(1919);
Re Navarro, 77 Cal. App. 2d 500,175 P. 2d 896 (1946).
The effect of such legitimation by acknowledgment,
in the absence of any provision in the law to the contrary,
is to confer upon the child and the parent the same rights
and status as though the child had been born in lawful
wedlock, according to each the reciprocal rights and
duties of and the same as all legitimate children and their
parents. The wording of the statute in this regard is quite
clear: ''and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth.''

Pfeiffer Y. TTT right, 41 F. 2d 464, 73 A.L.R. 932 (1930);
Alrison v. Bryan., 21 Okla. 557, 97 P. 282, 18 L.R.A.
(n. s.) 931 (1908).
By the expression, ''publicly acknowledging it as
his own,'' is mennt the disclosure of the fact of paternity,
\vithout conet'nlmeut, to r<.~latiYes, friends, acquaintances,
and others.
14
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In re Skinrner's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 2d 528, 151 P. 2d
31 (1944);
In re Gathings' Estate, 199 Okla. 460, 187 P. 2d 9-81
(1947);
In reFlood's Estate, 217 Cal. 763, 21 P. 2d 579(1933);
In re Baird's Estate, 173 Cal. 617, 160 P. 1078 (1916);
In re Garr, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906);
In re Gird's Estate, 157 Cal. 534, 108 P. 499 (1910).
Gordon publicly acknowledged that he was Karl's
father by filling out and filing the certificate of birth describing himself as the father (Ex. 11). In Estate of McNamara the court said that there could be no more public
acknowledgment than the act of the father in signing the
child's birth certificate describing himself as the father.
Immediately following Karl's birth, Gordon notified
Susan's mother (R. 39). Susan's father named the child,
giving it the middle name of Bernett which is is the middle name of a brother of Gordon, now deceased (R. 174,
151). Gordon publicly acknowledged that Karl was his
son to all with whom he came into contact (R. 44, 89, 108,
112, 113, 121, 122, 130, 133, 134, 137, 140, 164, 222). Witnesses for the petitioner are among this group. The record is abundantly filled with evidence to this effect; it is
absolutely devoid of any denial of pat'ernity or inference
of any denial of paternity. Acknowledgment of paternity
has been made to the petitioner (R. 91), in open court
(R. 92), to friends (R. 155) and to acquaintances
(R. 164, 273).
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The household of a bachelor constitutes a ''family''
as also does the household of the father even though he
may be living in an unlawful relationship with the child's
mother.
In re Garr, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906);
In re Jones' Esta.te, 166 Cal.108, 135 P. 288 (1913);
In re Gathirngs' Estate, 199 Okla. 460, 187 P. 2d 981
1947);

Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552, 7 A.L.R.
131 (1919);
In Re McGrew, 183 Cal. 177, 190 P. 804 (1920).
The father was a bachelor in the Garr case. In the
]feNama,ra case the father lived with the child's mother
who was the lawful \Yife of another. In the JlcGre1v case
the parents lived \Yithout the benefit of the marriage ceremony as man and \vife. To hold otherwise would defeat
the obvious purpose and the plain meaning of the
statute.
Gordon, Susan and l{arl lived together as a family
unit until Susan's departure \Yith Sharp (R. 44, 45, 89,
113, 121). Susan had so testified, according to the
record, in the earlier proceedings (R. 6). The court specifically found that Gordon and Susan lived together as
man and wife from February ~1, 1953, to October 30, 1955
( R. 22, No. ~).
Gordon's previous marriage cannot affect the application of t ht~ leg-itimation statute, for that marriage \Yas
16
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terminated prior to Karl's birth. The Court err.ed somewhat in its finding that Gordon was married to one
Martha Dander Singer from June 22, 1952, to September
24, 1953. The translation of the document (R. 95) and
the document itself (Ex. 1) show that Gordon 'vas married to one Martha Bander Singer on November 19, 1951,
and that the date of the annulment is April 5, 1952. A
careful reading of either the translation or the original
shows that September 24, 1953, is the date borne by the
copy in evidence, which is a combination of the 1narriage
and the annulment records. Error or not, Gordon was not
married to another at the time he lived with Susan, and
the evidence is clear that he had not been married to
Singer for over two and one-half years prior to Karl's
birth.
That Karl was ''received'' into Gordon's family cannot be seriously questioned. Receiving is accomplished
by a physical acceptance or being of the child, even though
for a short length of time in the household of the father.
In this instance the time was not short, it was over nine
months.
The Jon.es, Gathings, McGrew, and McNamara cases,
previously cited, support this proposition. So also does
In re Buffington's Estate, 169 Oka 487, 38 P. 2d 22 (1934).
In the Jones case two months sufficed ; in the Gathings
case visits to the father's abode were held sufficient.
As to the ''otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child'' portion of the statute the result is equally
clear. The standard set is the treatment which the par17
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ticular father in question would have given to a legitimate
child under the same circumstances, not what he should
give, nor what the majority of men would give, to such
a child.

Re Kessler's Estate, 74 N.W. 2d 599 (S.Dak. 1956).
Estate of Heaton, 139 Cal. 237, 73 P. 186 (1903);
In re Gird's Estate, 157 Cal. 534, 108 P. 499; (1910);
In re Jones' Estate, 166 Cal. 108, 135 P. 288 (1913) ;
The record shows that Gordon took good care of his
child, despite the concerted attempts of the petitioner's
witnesses to show illness. The conclusion to be drawn
from the evidence is that Gordon "~as very fond of his
son, and was proud of him. He was taken with him w
visit neighbors. He was treated as if he were legitimate.
The evidence is not controverted with regard to the
legitimation of l(arl. One wonders if the cumulative
effect of the prior proceedings wherein the attempt by
parties present to brand l{arl as illegtimate was consistentl~,. made (note, for example, the statement to such
effect in the Appearance, Waiver and Consent for Adoption appearing on eourt stationery (R. 8)) and the previous actions of the court taken upon such a premise of
illegitimacy may not haYe served to construct too high a
hurdle for the full appreciation of the legal significance of
the facts presented to the court in the hearing.
Were the failure of the court to find Karl legitimate
merelr an error of form, there 'vould be little ground for
complaint. TIH--. error, ho,veYPl\ 'Yas mor<? than one of hol18
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low form - it was very substantial. Failure to consider
Karl to be the legitimate son of Gordon, from the begin.:
ning .of this series of actions, undoubtedly contributed
greatly to the treatment of this case as though it were a
habeas corpus proceeding.
There is a material difference between a habeas corpus proceeding and a statutory action such as this. The
first is usually a contest between persons each having a
similar or nearly equal interest in the child. The latter
is an action brought in the name of the state in a court of
limited jurisdiction and power, not to determine relative
rights of custody, but initially at least, to determine
whether the conditions existing at the time of the petition and hearing are such as to require the intervention
of the state in the interest of the child, and if so, then to
apply the power of the state, pursuant to the law, for that
purpose. That purpose is the interest of the child, not the
interest of an adoption agency with a waiting list.

POINT II.
KAR.L BERNETT BAILEY IS NOT A NE,GLECTED CHILD WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE
LAW AND THEREFO·RE THE COURT. WAS WITHOUT POWER TO DEPRIVE J. GORDON BAILEY
OF THE. CUSTODY OF HIS SO·N.

The Juvenile Courts of the State of Utah are specially created courts of limited jurisdiction. The source of
their jurisdiction is Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-5, which
provides with reference to the issues on this appeal:
19
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The juvenile court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the neglect, dependency, and delinquency of children who are
under eighteen years of age, ... and the custody,
detention, guardianship of the person, trial and
care of such neglected, dependent and delinquent
children....
Prior cases in this court have affirmed the rule that
unless the facts of the controversy bring the case within
the scope of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, such
court does not have the power to interfere or act in the
matter. And in order to make a determination with reference to the child and a parent, such parent must also
be before the court.

In re Bennett, 77 Utah 247, 293 P. 963 (1930);
In re Graham, 110 Utah 159, 170 P. 2d 172 (1946):
In re Johnson, 110 Utah 500, 175 P. 2d 486 (1946);
In re Bradley, 109 Utah 538, 167 P. 2d 978 (1946) .
.t\lthough alleged to be both a dependent and neglected child in the petition filed by \"'"irginia Lee Bennett
April 30, 1957, the court's failure to find "~ith reference
to dependeney eliminates that aspect of the ca.se. Neglect, as concerns our controYersy, is statutorily defined
and limited bY Utah Code .A.Jlll. 1953, 55-10-6:
The \Yords ''neglected child'' include:
A ehild "Tho is abandoned hy his parents, guardian
or custodian.
A ehild "Tho larks proper parental eare by reason
of the fault or habits of the parent, guardian or
enRtodian.
20
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A child whose parent, guardian or custodian neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary
subsistence, education, medical or surgical care or
other care necessary for his health, morals or wellbeing.
A child whose parent, guardian or custodian neglects or refuses to provide the special care made
necessary by his mental condition.
A child who is found in a disreputable place or who
associates with vagrant, vicious or immoral
persons.
A child who engages in an occupation or is in a
situation dangerous to the life or limb or injurious
to the health or morals of himself or others.
This court in the Joh(fi)Son case stated, at page
489, with reference to dependency, "the law contemplates a then existing condition of dependency
that requires the intervention of the juvenile court.''
The definitions of a ''dependent child'' in this same
section of the statute, Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-6,
are also in the present tense. The Johnson case rule is
applicable with equal vigor for the prevention of unwarranted court action in an alleged ''neglected child'' case
as well as in a ''dependent child'' case.
It would be an anomalous situation and undoubtedly a
deprivation of due process to confer upon the juvenile
court jurisdiction of a child because one parent fails in its
duties when the other parent has not and allow the court
to deprive the non-erring parent of the custody of his
child permanently by virtue of the default of the other.
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There is authority for the proposition that even the
petition is void if it fails to include the essential elements
required for jurisdiction. This court's holding in the
J ohn,son case is applicable here.
A realization by the juvenile court that the Society's
failure to attempt to locate Gordon, their refusal to return
Karl to Gordon and their exclusive custody of the child
had effectively foreclosed any opportunity for Gordon
to care for his child during the entire period commencing
February 9, 1956, and continuing unbroken to the time of
the hearing should have limited the court's inquiry, if
any, to the question of whether Gordon had abandoned
his child.
Abandonment was alleged in the petition; it ''Tas not
found by the court. Not stopping a mother from taking
her nine-month-old nursing child with her hardly constitutes abandonment by the father.

In re Walton, 123 Utah 380, 259 P. 2d 881 (1953);
Jensen v. Ea.rley, 63 Utah 604, 228 P.

~17

(1924);

.

35 A.L.R. 2d 663 contains a comprehensiYe collection
of recent cases.
The second allegation is that because of the faults
and habits of the father, the child lacks proper parental
care. The facts alleged relate to the preYious relationship between Gordon and Susan and a non-specific gen0ral nllegation of ''other faults and habits.''

t1

Th(l t the eourt errPd to tla~ substantial prejudicial
rror of thP child and his father 'Yhen the eourt decreed
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"that J. Gordon Bailey, because of his faults and habits
and manner of living should not have the custody of his
child returned to him and is hereby deprived of his rights
to the custody of said child," is self-evident upon a comparison of the findings of the juvenile court with the evidence before it. Substantially three-fourths of the court's
findings are based on Susan's testimony, or consist not
of findings of fact at all, but of mere recitals of Susan's
statements. Her testimony is, in the main, unsubstantiated by any of the other twenty-one witnesses in
the case.
For example (R. 22, Para. 2) " . . . Susan Willis
Sharp met J. Gordon Bailey at an art exhibit and kept
company for a short time engaging in sexual intercourse
without marriage ... '' is unsupported by any evidence
except the statement of Susan herself, which is contradicted by Gordon (R. 258).
In paragraph 4, " ... while in California Susan Willis
had a miscarriage and was given no medical care by her
husband; that she testified that she asked Mr. Bailey for
medical attention but was refused ... ''; the testimony of
lack of medical care is supported only by Susan's testimony (R. 260, 261) and refuted by Gordon (R. 269).
Also in paragraph 4, " .... the mother testified that
J. Gordon Bailey in refusing to give her medical attention
said that birth was a natural thing; that animals did not
have doctors in giving birth to their offspring and that
doctors infected people with cancer so that they could
continue getting money from their patients.'' Again this
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testimony from the mother who has abandoned two children to adoption agencies is refuted by the father who
wants to raise his own child himself (R. 265).
In paragraph 5, the court says that Susan further
testified as to Gordon's forcing her to participate in unnatural sex practices and that he engaged in unnatural
sex practices with her brother, age 12. No other evidence
supports this statement, which even the court did not :find
as a fact, but merely repeated. One wonders why the
boy was not brought before the court.
Also, in paragraph 5, repeating evidence, but not
finding facts, the court made reference to Susan's testimony that Gordon suggested she become a prostitute and
the suggestion that she have a girl friend come li'\Te \nth
them so they could have sex relations as a trio. Later,
with reference to the girl friend, Susan contradicted her
prior testimony and admitted that she might have made
the suggestion herself (R. 320). What \Yeight is to be accorded to this V{Oman 's contradictory eYidence?
.1\nd in Paragraph 8 (R,. 23), the court recited "that
Susan testified that just prior to her lea-'\ing, J. Gordon
Bailey said "he hoped he could dump the baby and her.''
This non-finding of fact recital of hearsay testimony
has been blown out of proportion eYen by being inserted
i 11 the findings, for Susan said that Sharp told her this
( R. 283). Is this t h P eYidencl~ upon ". hich a parent-child
rclation~hip, already partially dismembered, is to be com}>1(\1 ely extinguished~
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The finding (R. 23, Para. 11) '' ... that his ouly effort
for the custody of the child was after he was contacted by
the Children's Service Society and he then learned that
the child was being considered for adoption, . . . '' is
equally clearly contrary to the overwhelming vTeight of
the evidence, even that supplied by the petitioner's case,
as far as the inference that Gordon made no attempt to
find his son prior to being notified the Society had him.
Susan's mother testified that Gordon was upset when
Susan left (R. 40); that Gordon tried to locate the child
(R. 44). Alice Olsen testified that Gordon contacted
Susan and the child during the first three months after
Susan's departure (R. 70). Sharp's sister testified that
Gordon asked her where Susan was (R. 163). Testimony
by Susan's father indicated Gordon wanted Susan to
return (R. 163). Gordon testified the child was taken only
over his objection (R. 226). At this time, Gordon contacted the Willis's, Sharp's sister, and others (R. 225,
226, 229, 231). He visited Sharp's mother (R. 163). He
\Vrote to Susan (R. 236, 237) asking their return. He and
Susan's parents traveled to Goldhill, Nevada, in search of
Susan and Karl (R. 174). Gordon communicated with
Sharp's brother (R. 234), and testified he checked with
the bus and train stations (R. 231).
The determination that Gordon's manner of living
is such that he should not have the child is totally unsupported by any competent evidence. Only Susan, her mothe.r, and Alice Olsen testified adversely to his living conditions, while Mr. Johnson, and l{aryl J. Lamont, people
\vith no axe to grind, indicated quite to the contrary (R.
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171, 172, 186). Mr. Johnson's tetimony (starting at R.
_170) should be given the credence and weight it deserves.
He raised a family in the same house.
As to the care of the child, only Susan and Susan's
sister intimate any mistreatment of the child, while numerous other witnesses indicated to the contrary and that
the child was happy and exceptionally healthy (R. 109,
113, 121, 130, 131, 134, 141, 142). The only testimony of
illness is from Susan and her mother. Gordon's boss for
the past four years indicated Gordon to be a good worker,
and at times to ',York too hard (R. 128).
The evidence as to sexual deviation is so suspect that
it deserves no weight. The basic source of this testimony
is the woman who on one hand says Gordon forced her
to have unnatural sexual intercourse "~hile at the same
time testifying that while living with him for three years
she wanted to marry him, begged him to marry her in
fact. Which story is true~ It is suggested that each suggests mendacity in the other. Even Susan's sister, who
testified about advances to,vard her by Gordon, -was a frequent visitor at Gordon's home nonetheless. Is her story
to be given any substantial \Veight? The proper conclusion is that no improper adYances were made (R. 71~78).
Witnesses testified that they \vould prefer Gordon
to raise their children should they be unable to (R. 109,
131, 135, 138).
The only renl evidence of neglect of the child is the
child's eondition ""hen Susan turned it over to the Society,
after hn ving had it in hPr care for over three months.
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The petitioner's evidence is that at that time the child
suffered from allergies, a rash and a bronchial c Jndition.
Who refused the child medical care~ Even the court
found it apparently healthy while in Gordon's home
(R. 23, Para. 8).
Susan's mother was accepted by the court as a medical
expert. Surely she or Susan would have obtained aid before bringing the child to the Society. But it is clear they
tlid not. Now they come in and complain about Gordon.
?\Iuch ado is made about Gordon's failure to have the child
immunized against various diseases. It is clear that at
the time Susan or her mother could have done so without Gordon's alleged resistance, that they did not (R. 56).
It is common knowledge that many children are conceived and born out of \vedlock and that a majority of
these children are taken from their natural parents and
placed for adoption through the services of state licensed
agencies. The increased tendency to juvenile delinquency
in unnatural parent-child units is \vell known. In this
instance there is the wonderful opportunity to reunite
a father and a so11. l\1 ust "business as usual" be so immune to obvious merits of a natural parent-child relationship as to deny this child the right to know his father
in order that the orderly procedures of the Society be not
disrupted.
Actually the greater part of the 321 pages of the
transcript of the oral testimony concerned itself v1ith what
the Appellant submits to be immaterial and irrelevant
Inatters inte11ded to prove that because of past conduct
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the child was neglected. It is impossible to consider all of
the evidence in the limited scope of this brief. The Apellant respectfully submits that this Court's responsibility
extends to a careful study of the evidence and the record.
The conclusion is inescapable that the question of
''neglect'' as defined by Utah law was shunted aside and
the case determined by rules which are applicable to a
different set of facts. In a contest as to custody between
two persons each having a natural or legal right to a
child, it may not be improper to weigh carefully in the
scales of justice the various factors which the court considers to affect the interests of the child. This is not improper because regardless of which person gets the child,
it is a person with a right to the child in the first instance.
Such is not the case here. The petitioner and the Society
have no rights to Karl save such as might be attributable
to the order of the Juvenile Court in the matter. Their
only interest other,Yise is that interest prompted by the
nature of the Society's ac.tiYity- placing of children for
adoption \Vi th people not even parties to the contest. Instead of concerning itself with the question of ''neglect''
it is apparent that the petitioner's position that she would
not place a child in Gordon ,s home for adoption set for
the court the minimum standard \Yith regard to whether
Gordon would ever see his child again and controlled the
court's determination of the matter. One questions
whether our society is so socialized that a father must
gain the p<.)rmission of an adoption agency before he can
enjoy the love and companionship of his o'Yn son.
28
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The law is well settled that the decisive it.sue in a
proceeding of this nature is the initial determination, free
from other factors, of whether the child is a ''neglected
child.'' If not, it follows that the court is withc~ut jurisdiction to interfere with a parent's rights to its child.

In re Youn.g, 180 Ore.187, 174 P. 2d 189 (1946);
In re John,son., 110 Utah 500, 175 P. 2d 486 (1946);
State v. Pogue, 282 S.W. 2d (Springfield Ct. of App.
1955);
In re Warren, 243 P. 2d 632 (Wash. 1952) ;
In re Rinker, 117 A. 2d 780 (Pa. Sup. 1955);
Pettit v. Engelking, 260 S.W. 2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953).
Custody controversies of this nature do not arise in
vacuo, but because someone either desires to impress their
standards of conduct upon the parent or child, or desires
to avail themselves of the juvenile court as an adoption
court, or both.

Ford v. State, 104 N.E. 2d 406 (Ind. App. 1952);
In re Knight, 212 La. 357, 31 So. 2d 825 (1947);
People v. Hmton, 330 Ill. App. 130, 70 N.E. 2d 261
(1946);
Carrera v. Kelly, 283 P. 2d 162 (Colo. 1955 ).
The Washington Supreme Court in the Warren. case
said, at page 633, in reference to their statute:
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The juvenile court has no jurisdiction over a minor
unless it is proved that the minor is either (a) delinquent or (b) a dependent child. In re Miller,
Wash., 242 P. 2d 1016. The concept that all children are wards of the state, and that the state and
its agencies have an unhampered right to determine "what is best for the child," is not a recent
or an advanced idea. It belongs to a repudiated,
political and moral philosophy foreign and repugnant to American institutions. Stated more specifically, the mere fact that certain individuals invoke
the aid of our courts to litigate the question of who
shall have the custody and control of a minor, does
not, ipso facto, vest our courts with jurisdiction to
decide the issues presented. The court must :first
find the child either delinquent or dependent.
The philosophy expressed in the Rimker case is particularly apropos the present controversy. There the
court said, at page 783:
A child cannot be declared ''neglected' ' merely because his condition might be improved by
changing his parents. The welfare of many children might be served by taking them from their
homes and placing them in what the officials may
consider a better home. But the Juyenile Court
I~aw was not intended to provide a procedure to
take the children of the poor and giYe them to the
rich, nor to take the children of the illiterate and
give them to the educated, nor to take the children
of the crude and giYe them to the eultured, nor to
take the children of the weak and sickly and give
them to the strong and healthy.
The power of the juvenile court is not to adjudicate what is for the best interests of a child,
but to adjudicate "'"hether or not the child is
neglected.
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That past conditions and conduct are not sufficient to
bring a child within the purview of the ''neglected child''
provisions of statutes such as ours is well established.

In re Johnson, 110 Utah 500, 175 P. 2d 486 (1946);
In re Knight, 212 La. 357, 31 So. 2d 825 (1947);
Pettit v. Engelking, 260 S.W. 2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953);
In re Rinker, 117 A. 2d 780 (Pa. Sup. 1955).
The rule of lavv vvhich the petitioner asks to be
applied in this case is that upon a showing of evidence of
past nonconformity on the part of a parent, that parent's
child shall be declared a ward of the juvenile court and
immediately adopted by strangers to the court. This rule
allows no locus poenitentiae. It is an innovation to our
law. No authority for this rule has been found. And it
is submitted that such a rule as novv espoused by the
petitioner shocks the human conscience, is repugnant
to a sense of fair play and is contrary to minimum standards of human dignity.
Under these circumstances, the decision of counsel
not to prolong a hearing by introducing rebuttal evidence
against what is submitted is immaterial evidence and
upon which the petitioner has the strong and clear burden
of persuasion cannot be construed as a judicial admission.
Considering the factors and circumstances of the case
this evidence is not even competent to show past neglect.
Even taking the evidence in the light least favorat le
to Gordon, there is insufficient competent evidence 1.11
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the record to sustain a finding of present neglect. It must
be here noted that most of the evidence introduced by
the petitioner in this regard was not found to be fact by
the court. The court made certain specific findings of fact
as required by statute. As to other matters the court only
recited that certain witnesses had testified as to certain
matters. This does not meet the requirement for specific
findings.
The third allegation that Gordon has neglected and
refused to provide subsistence, medical care, etc., is
equally without merit in this proceeding. The arguments
previously enumerated concerning the necessity of present neglect are incorporated herein by reference.
A divergence of views as to the adequacy of past
medical care is not present neglect. Unless the child is in
present danger of an extreme degree the court will not
impose its vie,vs in these matters upon a parent, and even
then such action is taken ''ith greatest reluctance and
onlv to the minimum extent necessa.rv.
o'

•

In re Hudson, 126 P. 2d 765 (\·rash. 1942).
Even strong dissatisfaction "Tith a parent's past
treatment of his child is not grounds in law for summarily
ordering that such child be adopted by unknown persons.
,Justice may he blind, but must it be cruel also f
If, within the scope of this third allegation, Karl is
a neglected child, "'"P need but look to Susan and the
Soeiety to pinpoint responsibiltiy.
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If the judgment of the lower court is to be s ~stained,
it can only be sustained if the following question would
be answered in the affirmative by this court: lLssuming
Gordon's wife to be no'v pregnant or to become so in the
future, would this court, upon the record now be fore it in
this case, be justified in depriving Gordon of the custody
of such a child in the event something untoward happened
to the mother~
If Gordon IS the unfit creature which the petitioner would have us believe he is, why has not the Society suggested any of the many steps possible to effect
a rehabilitation so that he and his son may be reunited~
One wonders if the failure so to do is not an indication
that there never was either an intention or desire to do
otherwise than dispose of l{arl through the placement
facilities of the Society.
The fourth allegation is that the child is in a situation
dangerous to his health and morals.
The arguments set forth with reference to the other
three allegations are in point here, and are hereby incorporated by reference. The court did not find on this allegation and therefore the finding to be inferred is against
the petitioner.
POINT III.
THE COUR.T ERRED IN ADMITTING AND
IN CONSIDERING IN ITS DECISIO·N EVIDENCE
CONCERNING ALLEGED ADO·PTIVE P'ARE·NT'S.

The testimony of 'vitnesses for the petitioner, and
particularly Virginia Lee Bennett herself support the
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conclusion that she and the Society connived to keep Karl
from his father.
On February 7, 1956, Susan contacted the Children's
Service Society about placing her and Gordon's child
there (R. 55). Virginia Lee Bennett admits that no attempt was made to search for either the birth certificate
of the child or for the name of the father (R. 85)ce She notarized the authorization to take the child (R. 85) and on
February 9, 1956, the Society took custody of the child
from Susan (R. 55). Virginia Lee Bennett now asserts
that Susan gave her the \Yrong birthdate and name of the
father, and that, therefore, a search could not be made
(R. 85). No reference is ever made by her that she ever
tried to get more detailed information from Susan in
order to locate the father. The conclusion is inescapable
that there was no desire to know this information - a
predetermined conclusion, arrived at without a proper
investigation or hearing, that the father ought to be deprived of his rights to the child (R. 90).
On November 21, 1956, Susan had already told the
Society that she no longer wanted the child (R. 58). On
December 12, 1956, without attempting to locate the father (R. 86), a hearing was held in which the court found
the child to be dependent and neglected. The true name of
the father and the true birthdate of the child \Yere known
prior to this hearing (R. 1, 84).
On January 19, 1957, eleYen months after the Society
took custody of Karl, the Society \Yas advised that a
hearing ought to be held to deprive the father of his
rights (R. 59, 88). This \vns before any attempts had been
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made to locate the father or any investigation made concerning him or his rights.
In August or September, 1956, Virginia Lee Bennett
knew Lee (R. 80) and that Lee knew J. Gordon Bailey,
father of l(arl (R. 80) and in December she received personal kno"\vledge of their 'vedding (R. 81). Even so, no
mention was made to Lee, nor to Gordon, about the child
(R. 85, 86). Shortly after Christmas, in the month of December, 1956, Lee informed her that she and Gordon were
going to take a trip to California (R. 81). Even at this
time no n1ention 'vas made to Lee about Gordon's child
or the proceedings which were in progress (R. 86). It is
equally obvious that during the several occasions when
Virginia Lee Bennett called the parents of Lee, that she
did not tell them about Gordon's child or its predicament (R. 80).
Not until April 19, 1957, fourteen months after the
Society obtained possession of Karl, was Gordon called
and asked to come in concerning the boy (R. 60). Gordon kept this appointment (R. 60), but was offered no
information about the boy, offered no assistance in regaining him, instead he was then and there asked to
sign his child away (R. 86).
Gordon refused, informing the Society he "'\\7anted to
keep the child ( R. 71, 81).
Gordon and counsel visited Virginia Lee Bennett
shortly thereafter and were told that the child had not
been placed for adoption (R. 346), yet even while making
that_statement, if we are to place credence in the rest of

35
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

her testimony, she knew that the child had been placed in
a foster home for fourteen and one-~alf months, that the
foster home parents had applied for adoption, and that
the Society had approved their qualification (R. 349, 350).
Immediately following all these futile efforts by Gordon to see and regain custody of his only child, Virginia
Lee Bennett filed the present petition alleging that Gordon had neglected and abandoned his child. The sequence
of events suggest the possibility of a long-range preconceived plan to see that Gordon did not regain his son.
Plan or no plan the evidence about the foster parents is
immaterial to any issue then before the court in this statutory neglect proceeding, but was materially persuasive
according to the finding, conclusion and judgment.

In re Warren, 243 P. 2d 632 (Wash. 1952).
Adoption agencies " . ho hire foster parents to temporarily rare for children in their custody are usually careful not to mislead sueh foster home parents into believing
that they have any rights to the children in their care.
It is a perversion of the legitmate use of the juvenile
court that it be used to facilitate adoption proceedings
which cannot otherwise be accomplished because a parent
will not willingly relinquish his o". n child into the permanent future care and custody of strangers.
The repugnanc.e felt at the u8e of this type of proceeding is expressed \Yithout reserYation in Carrera v.
J(ellcy, ~83 P. ~d 16~ (Colo. 1955). Perhaps the author of
that opinion is a father.
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It is unfortunate that the abstract only "vas published
in People v. Hinton., 330 Ill. App. 130, 70 N.E. 2d 261
(1946), for though there are undoubtedly differences in
the statutes and in the nature of the misuse, the published
abstract well conveys the judicial dislike of abuse of
actions of this type. Part reads :
To permit neglected child proceedings instigated by paternal grandfather against n1other to
be prosecuted in interest of grandfather ty special
counsel hired by grandfather, and to allov;r the case
to be used as an opening wedge for divorce, was
not an exercise of county court's sound discretion, and was error requiring reversal of order
depriving mother of custody of child.
There is no justification for ignoring Utah Code Ann.
1953, 55-10-30, which limits the power of the court in the
matter of its judgment, or Utah Code ~.Lnn. 1953, 55-10-31,
whieh contemplates a retention of continuing jurisdiction
as long as the child is a ward of the court, or the preferred
rights of parents guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. 1953,
55-10-32, or the rights of a parent to regain custody of his
child given him by Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-41, and
for summarily acting in the capacity of an adoption court.
Even Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-43, which purports to
authorize the court's approval of adoptions cannot be con,strued to bypass the plain import of the law and the protections afforded a parent and child. This provision must
be construed in the light of the other provisions and the
court decisions construing them.
In Ford v. Stale, 104 N.E. 2d 406, 407 (Ind. App.
1952) the court said :
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with a minimum of disruption is to be denied the inalienable right of all children to grow to maturity in the home
of their natural parent because an adoption agency so
desires.

POINT IV.
THE O·RDER PURPO·RT~NG TO DEPRIVE J.
GO,RDON BAILEY PERMANENTLY O·F ALL
RIGHTS TO THE CUSTODY OF HIS SO~N AND TO
AUTHO·RIZE HIS ADOPTION IS VOID BEC'AUSE
IT IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS AND
IS CO·NTRARY TO LAW.

Even if the court's finding of neglect should stand,
its order permanently depriving Gordon of his son is
void.
Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-32, provides, for our
purposes:
No child ... shall be taken from the custody
of its parents ... unless the court shall find from
the evidence introduced in the case that such parent . . . has knowingly failed and neglected to
provide for such child the proper maintenance,
care, training, and education contemplated andrequired by both law and morals, ... or unless the
court shall find from all the circumstances of the
case that public welfare or the welfare of the child
requires that his custody be taken from its
parents ...
One searches the findings in vain for a statement that
Gordon has either ''knowingly failed and neglected to provide ... '' or ''that the public welfare or the welfare of
the child requires'' that Gordon be deprived of his cus-
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tody. What the court did conclude is that in its opinion it
would be best for Karl to remain with those unidentified
persons whom the Society assert desire to adopt Karl.
Such a finding does not meet the requirements of the law
for it is vastly different from either of the findings required to validly deprive a parent of his child, even
temporarily.
Nor does the evidence support either ground, for
the only conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are
that l{arl was as healthy, at least, as the average child
and that he was not deprived of care necessary for his
well being. Though Gordon's income at the time of the
hearing may have been modest it was sufficient. He is debt
free, owns a car and a truck, lives in a home which boasts
all the modern conveniences, and he is ready, willing, and
able to support his child. Surely the fight he is now
waging for the return of his child is indicative of his determination to care for his child himself.
The point no"\v under debate is whether the juvenile
court has the po·w·er in a proceeding such as this to permanently deprive a parent of the rights to his child, without any further limitation on the court's power than that
it find the child neglected. The better reasoning compels
a negative ans,Yer, although no direct authority in point
has been found.
{Ttah Code Ann. 1943, 55-10-30, enumerates the permissible judgments in a neglect action. This section is
devoid of any authority for a complete seYerance of the
parent-r.hild relationship. It expressly provides that the
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preference of parents shall be given due- consideration.
The last portion of this section is limited by the phrase
"to the end that its wayward tendencies shall be corrected and the child saved to useful citizenship'' which clearly
limits this provision to delinquency cases.
Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-31, expressly provides
for continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Utah Code Ann. 1953, 55-10-41, provides a means for
the parent to regain his child upon a showing of changed
circumstances at any time.
It is not to be seriously contended that Utah Code
Ann. 1953, 55-10-43, allows a permanent deprivation of
all rights any time there is evidence of persons who desire
to adopt a child in the custody of the court. If so, why has
the legislature not openly bestowed adoption jurisdiction
upon the juvenile court~
Only the district court has power to effect an adoption, and limits are placed upon its power. The power of
the juvenile court to authorize an adoption must be within the limits of the district court to effect one.
Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4, apparently considerably longer a part of Utah law than the present definition of
"neglected child," covers, for the purpose of the case at
bar, only instances when the parent has been judicially
deprived of the custody of his child on account of ''cruelty, neglect or desertion.''
There is no authority nor basis in logic to assume
that ''neglect'' in the one provision means the same as
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"neglected child" in the other. One is for the purpose of
foregoing the necessity of parental consent in an adoption
proceeding; the other is for the purpose of defining the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. To construe ''neglect''
in the adoption statute to be synonymous with ''neglected
child'' in the juvenile court law would undoubtedly be
unconstitutional for it would result in the possibility of
a parent's losing his child forever upon any finding of
neglect. Such a construction would run contrary to the
many provisions in the law designed to preserve the integrity of the family unit._
There may be instances in which the juvenile court
might find such cruelty, neglect or desertion as would justify the district court, upon an examination of the record
from the juvenile court, in proceeding with an adoption.
There is no such finding in this case and since the district
court could not validly order an adoption neither can
the juvenile court validly authorize it.
In addition, the minimum requirements of procedural due process require that a person be given notice of
the cause of action alleged against him and some indication of the relief demanded. The petition is silent in
regard to adoption of J{arl by others. The issue of adoption was not tried " . ith the consent of the parties Gordon properly objected. In such a situation as this a
judgment exceeding the scope of the petition is invalid.
Fisher v. B;~~lu.nd, 97 Utah 463, 93 P. 2d 737 (1940).
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POINT V.
EVEN ASSUMING THE JUVENILE COURT
TO· HAVE HAD THE POWER TO TEMPORARILY
DEPRIVE J. GORDON BAILEY OF' THE ClUSTODY
OF HIS S.ON, T'O DO SO, WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CONTRARY TO L·A W.

The previous argument concerning the failure of the
Court to find that the welfare of the child or of society
required depriving Gordon of the custody of his son,
is hereby incorporated by reference.
Whether gauged against the statutory enactments of
the juvenile court law or against the judicially formed
precedents in habeas corpus custody proceedings there is
no justification for not returning Karl to his father.

In re Bradley, 109 Utah 538, 167 P. 2d 978 (1946);
B aldttoin v. Nielson, 110 Utah 172, 170 P. 2d 179 ( 1946) ;
Devera.ux v. Brown, 2 Utah 2d 30, 268 P. 2d 995
(1954);

When it has been felt necessary to separate a child
from his parents, extreme judicial restraint has been exercised to protect the right of the parent to the future custody of his child and the right of the child to his parent.
In the Bradley case this court affirmed the lower
court's finding that the child was neglected. The mother
had intentionally left the child with others. She knowingly failed ancl neglected to provide for it. This court
affirmed a temporary deprivation of custody on the
ground that under then presently existing conditions the
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welfare of the child required that it be not immediately
returned to its mother. But in so doing, this court said,
at page 985:
This does not mean that Barbara will be forever barred from obtaining the custody of her
baby, the child remains a ward of the juvenile
court, and the custody of the child may be changed
when justified by the surrounding facts and
circumstances.
In the instant case there is no competent evidence
whatsoever to sustain even a temporary deprivation of
custody. The court did not find Gordon unfit. It did not
find his wife unfit. The court felt that because of Gordon's
"faults and habits and manner of living" the child would
be better off with its present custodians. This does not
meet the requirements set in the law for depriving a parent of his child.
Utah Code

~\.nn.

1953, 55-10-32.

Even proof of past immorality or misconduct can
only depriYe a parent of the present right to his child
"Then there is an inescapable conclusion that such misconduct will haYc a present effect upon the child, and
even then a child will not be placed upon the auction
block without giYing the parent an opportunity to reform.
It is the present conditions under which the child will
liYe, not the past conduct of the parent, that is decisiYe.
l~u

re Llliller,

~42

P. 2d 1016 (\\Tash. 1952);

I)etfit v. E-n,qelking, ~60 S.W. 2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App.

1953):
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In re Bradley, 109 Utah 538, 167 P.2d 978 (1946);
In re Johnson, 110 Utah 500, 175 P. 2d 486 (1946);
In re Zerick,. 129 N.E. 2d 661 (Ohio Juv. 1955);
In re Brya.n, 48 Nev. 352, 232 P. 776, 37 A.L.R. 527
(1925);
In the Z erick case the court said at page 665 :
Even where the state compels the parental
surrender of a child because of unfavorable circumstances clearly detrimental to the welfare of
the child, it will not order permanent surrender of
the parental rights and duties if effective control
over the child can be established through the
awarding of temporary guardianship and legal
custody without ending for all time these final
rights and duties. Ordinarily a parent though declared unfit will be permitted to reclaim the child
when the circumstances change for the better. Any
other policy would be harsh and cruel to the parent, a denial to the child of its natural birthright
and contrary to public policy.
In Sta.te v. Black, 3 Utah 2d 135, 283 P. 2d 887 (1955 ),
is the statement that'' unless the polygamous relationship
and the unlawful cohabitation between Leonard Black
and Vera Black cease, arnd completely, that the Juvenile
Court should take the children from the appellants p·ermanently. '' Unless wrenched out of context, this statement
cannot be offered to support the proposition that a child
should be withheld from its parent because of past, now
terminated, misconduct. The holding in the Black case is
not authority for the present controversy because of obvious factual differences. At the time of the petition in
45
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the Black case the children were living with their parents
and their parents were openly violating the criminal law
of the state of Utah and teaching their children to do
likewise.
If the court's reference to the "faults and habits and
manner of living" is based on relative material affluence,
such a comparison is insufficient to support a deprivation
of custody.

In re W a.rren, 243 P. 2d 632 (Wash. 1952).
It is also contrary to the evidence. There was no evidence introduced to the effect that Gordon could not presently support his child. All the evidence is to the contrary. Gordon is healthy, willing and able to care for his
child. His wife, though a divorced woman who has never
raised any children, is a refined, educated person. She is
a good cook, an excellent seamstress, a;nd most important
of all, she desires to care for Karl and to adopt him
as her own.
POINT VI.
THE· JUDGMENT MUST FAIL BECAUSE
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE CONCLUSIONS O·F LAW DO NOT SUPPORT IT.

rrhis argument is essentially a resume of the previous
arguments, whirh for the sake of brevity "\\rill not be here
repeated.
Utah (~ode Ann. 1953, 55-10-30, requires that the juYenile court ''shall ent<:)r in 'Yriting the facts constituting
such ... negleet ... ''
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Point II of this argument shows that the judgment
of neglect is not supported by the findings of fact. Points
IV and V concern the validity of the judgment permanently depriving Gordon of his child, or even of temporarily depriving Gordon of his child, and show that the
judgment of the court exceeds the findings of fact. These
arguments are hereby incorporated by reference.
The statutes of this state have established those conditions under which the juvenile court may act. They also
have established the requirements for the various actions
within the scope of the court's power.
These facts must be found by the court or its judgment cannot stand. A discussion of part of the evidence
and the court's reasoning as to why it arrived at its decision do not constitute the required findings.

Interstate Circui.t, Inc., v. [T. 8., 304 U. S. 55, 58 S. Ct.
768, 82 L. Ed. 1146 (1938).
The court's recital that certain witnesses testified as
to certain matters does not constitute a finding that the
matters so tesified to were true. The deliberate stating
that he found certain facts to be true and the equally deliberate stating that certain matters were testified to negatives any inference that the court found both categories
to be true.
A judgment not supported by the findings of fact
must fail.
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U.S. v. Seminole Nations, 299 U.S. 417, 57 S. St. 283,
81 L. Ed. 216 (1937).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief, the Appellant
submits that the judgment of the juvenile court is .erroneous, and that upon the thorough examination of the record, which is this court's responsibility, that this court
will concur that the judgment of the juvenile court must
be reversed.
It is respectfully submitted that the juvenile court
erred in not finding Karl Bernett Bailey to be the legitimate son of J. Gordon Bailey and in not granting the
prayer in Appellant's cross petition. It is further submitted that the juvenile court erred in finding Karl Bernett Bailey to be a neglected child, in entering its order
permanently depriving J. Gordon Bailey of all rights to
the custody of his son and in simultaneously authorizing
the adoption of Karl Bernett Bailey by strangers.
The Appellant prays that this court enter its order
finding Karl Bernett Bailey to be the legitimate son of
J. Gordon Bailey, Appellant, reYersing the :finding of
neglect and restoring to the Appellant the custody and
care of his son \Vi thout the continued jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.
But if this court dPe lines to grant in its entirety the
above prayer of the Appellant, the Appellant prays that
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this Court take such action upon such terms as it deems
just to the end that the Appellant may with a minimum
of unnecessary delay have the custody and care of his
son restored to him.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT L. SCHMID
Attorney for J. Gordon Bailey,
Appellant.
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